When one socialist regime after another toppled in the wake of 1989, history seemed to affirm Francis Fukuyama's recently forwarded thesis about its immanent demise. As Fukuyama observed in "The End of History," a century that began with liberalism in retreat had come full circle. Liberal democracy was again the order of the day, after surviving challenges from the right and left. What Fukuyama's triumphalism underestimated was the difficulty liberalism had in making the halting transition from limited popular rule to mass suffrage in the twentieth century. By the time liberal regimes began implementing universal suffrage after World War I, bolshevism and fascism had already introduced alternative models of mass participation. The perception that liberalism had failed to redeem its promise of emancipation as its parliamentary institutions spread across Europe in the nineteenth century helps explain the antagonism of avant-gardes in Germany and Italy for liberal ideals at the beginning of the twentieth. Indeed, a comparison of debates among German Expressionists and Italian Futurists before 1914 indicates that both groups viewed parliament as a relic of the nineteenth century that was destined to be washed away by a tidal wave of mass democracy. While this belief proved to be erroneous, their critique of parliamentary politics was prescient in anticipating the Achilles' heel in Fukuyama's apology for the finality of the liberal democratic model at century's end.
The failures of constitutional regimes in Germany and Italy to respond to rising demands for political rights at the turn of the twentieth century led to a politicization of modernism in these lands that was unique for Europe before 1914. While Expressionist and Futurist art often looked derivative of innovations emanating from Paris, none of the French revolutions in art, from Impressionism to Cubism, ever made claims to be vehicles of social revolution in the way that Expressionism and Futurism most emphatically did. And notwithstanding the fact that Expressionists and Futurists saw themselves constituting a cultural rather than political avantgarde, both groups were inspired by utopian visions of a mass society. Surprisingly, political debates documented in Expressionist and Futurist periodicals are informed by a single, shared metaphor, which compared the field of politics to a stage. This figure presents a contrast to socialist debates, which were preoccupied with the revisionism of the Second International. The preferred socialist metaphor compared the political field to a battlefield and dealt in imagery related to military strategy, as in 'war of position' vs. 'war of attrition.' It may seem odd that the cultural avant-garde, which borrowed its founding metaphor-that of an advance guard-from the martial imaginary of revolutionary politics, would abandon this imagery when it turned to politics. But Expressionists and Futurists preferred an image defined by the distinctions between actor and spectator, comedy and tragedy. The following analysis suggests that this trope played a key role in modernism's critique of liberalism's limited notion of popular rule.
"The proletarian masses, in particular, presented psychologists with a problem hardly encountered before in world history," Samuel Lublinski wrote in Die Bilanz der Moderne (The Balance of Modernism) in 1904. The rise of socialism in the late nineteenth century marked "the first time the 'people' had evolved into a conscious and clear-headed political player," he claimed (40) . As Lublinksi noted, politics had been the playground of princes for most of history. Only now were the masses beginning to develop political subjectivity, he argued. At the time, Lublinski was collaborating on a radical review, Kampf (Struggle) (Cammarano 8) . Apart from one reform that increased the electorate to seven percent in 1882, no further reform was attempted until Giovanni Gentile, the perennial prime minister of the prewar decade, proposed 'universal' (male) suffrage in June 1912, bringing the electorate up to 24 percent (Gentile, Le origini 231). In the years leading to this belated reform, the political writer for La Voce, Gaetano Salvemini, waged an impassioned campaign for universal suffrage from the pages of the journal and floor of Socialist Party congresses. "We can see but one means of salvation," he wrote after elections in March 1909, "the eruption of the illiterate masses in public life." Only then could the cycle of corruption and cooptation that dictated parliamentary politics be broken, Salvemini argued ("Commento").
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for the spectacle of the mobilized masses to Baudelaire's attraction to the "theater" staged by crowds in Paris in 1848. "Of course, it is a ridiculous illusion to expect anything of Prussian voting rights, of any parliamentary politics, no matter how democratic," he observed.
"And yet the popular masses now demonstrating in the streets of Prussian cities believe in a political ideal [...1. And who knows? Perhaps these lower-class citizens become beautiful by taking to the streets for this idea" (Hardekopf's emphasis). It would be easy to dismiss these comments as the patronizing opinions of a literary aesthete. Indeed, his description of protesters as "beautiful" seems to deny the political character of their actions. But Hardekopf was a hard-nosed political thinker who criticized Expressionist friends for being politically naive (Barnouw, Sheppard) . In this statement he was less concerned with aesthetics than with the psychic function of the demonstrations, which he claimed had given disenfranchised citizens an opportunity to exercise political subjectivity. In saying the performance had made them "beautiful," he suggested that it had ennobled them. He argued that the aim of the protesters had not been voting rights per se but rather "human dignity."
In The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) In caricaturing parliamentary politics as a "charade," Pfemfert employed the stage metaphor to disarticulate the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty from its identification with the liberal institution of parliament.
In Italy, La Voce had also worked to separate the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty from identification with the compromised institutions of liberalism. In the electoral commentary cited earlier, the staff of La Voce said they rejected all party labels but would have been happy to call themselves "democrats" if the name had not been "usurped" by the parties coinvolved in an undemocratic system of parliamentary cooptation. When Giolitti temporarily left government in December 1909, Prezzolini contrasted the perennial prime minister's skill at parliamentary deal-making with the ideal of popular sovereignty, arguing in "Da Giolitti a Sonnino" ("From Giolitti to Sonnino") that parliament actually ruled against the will of the people. "Giolitti's government was parliamentary and not national, which is to say, it was surrounded by the loyal support of a clientele in parliament and broad antipathy in the provinces" (225, Prezzolini's emphases). In a piece titled "Il problema della democrazia" ("The Problem of Democracy"), Antonio Anzilotti argued that the gap between parliament and the people had discredited the very idea of participatory democracy. "In reality, the principle of democracy, that it corresponds to the total sum of individual wills, has become totally bankrupt. The people have not put their hands to work in shaping the organs of state, and the state has only exercised the illusion of sovereignty" (679) . In criticizing what he considered to be a betrayal of democratic principles, Anzilotti asked whether a regime that claims to be democratic and yet permits its citizens to remain spectators does not forfeit its legitimacy.
Two years after Pfemfert began calling for Germans to boycott electoral politics, Italians were preparing for their first elections since parliament had approved Giolitti's bill introducing universal male suffrage. One of the dreams that inspired La Voce was finally becoming reality: Italy was making the transition to a modern, mass democracy. Hence, it might seem strange that Giovanni Papini, a vociano of the first hour, would echo Pfemfert's call for a boycott and tell voters, including those who had never before had the opportunity to vote, to stay home. But that is precisely what he did in a piece titled "Freghiamoci della politica" ("Let's Give a Damn About Politics"), published in Lacerba in October 1913. F.T. Marinetti, the founder and impresario of Futurism, responded with a hastily composed manifesto of Futurist politics, in which he appealed to Futurists to cast their ballots for a disparate agenda that ranged from "the economic defense and patriotic education of the proletariat" to a "cynical, astute, and aggressive foreign policy" ("Programma" 221). Papini published Marinetti's manifesto on the front page of the subsequent issue, but he also added a disclaimer in which he defended his call for an electoral boycott and criticized Marinetti for being politically naive ("Postilla").
In "Let's Give a Damn About Politics," Papini called on "intelligent" Italians to withhold support for a regime that staged comic entertainment in parliament to divert attention from the real exercise of power elsewhere, "behind the scenes." Here Papini echoed Pfemfert's use of the stage metaphor to critique the fictional quality of parliamentary representation. "Real political power is located outside the parties. They try as best they can to represent and exploit this power, but all they manage to do is hide it," he concluded. "Real politics, the politics of deeds and not debates, is the work of Capitalists, Priests, and Workers. The rest is only comedy played out in more or less good faith" ("Freghiamoci" 213 Papini understood that Giolitti had extended voting rights as a ploy to remain in power. For a decade anticipating this move, Giolitti had retained power by means of what came to be known as a parliamentary dictatorship. This term referred to his ability to assemble ad hoc majorities united by no agenda other than allegiance to him and his pork-barrel politics. During this decade, in which giolittismo became a synonym for trasformismo (the generic term for `cooptation'), Giolitti's ability to build patchwork majorities spanning the political spectrum had made ideological differences irrelevant. Papini correctly predicted that Giolitti would retain power regardless of whether millions of new voters pushed the political pendulum to the right or left. Giolitti would always win, Papini argued, because he knew how to play whichever role the "parliamentary comedy" demanded at a given moment. Giolitti could "play the socialist and the imperialist, all the while laughing under his breath at the theoretical calculations of those who fall for the performance on stage and never understand that in politics the real dramatic action takes place behind the scenes" ("Freghiamoci" 214). Papini suggested that the gap between the fiction on-stage and the actual exercise of power backstage had neutralized public debate and trivialized political life. As his commentary suggests, the problem of neutralization raised the challenge of creating a political culture that can provide a forum for the public representation of social differences and offer each party involved a meaningful opportunity to seek recognition.
Faced with the tragicomic impotence of the Reichstag, one of Germany's most prominent liberals, Max Weber, abandoned the ideal of parliament as a forum for interpreting the popular will. Weber argued instead that modern parliaments are nothing more than instruments used to orchestrate popular support for decisions made by a technocratic apparatus. "Today, parliaments are the means for making this minimum of consent superficially manifest," he wrote in 1917 (339) . Despite the reference to fictional performance, Weber 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2006] , Art. 6 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol30/iss2/6 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1636 joined the USI in calling for a general strike, which effectively shut down the national economy. The red flag was hoisted over public buildings in many municipalities throughout Italy, and the strike turned into armed rebellion in the Romagna, which had a long tradition of rural anarchism. In the end it took army troops a week to restore order. Gramsci would later describe the settimana rossa, or Red Week, as "the first, glorious intervention of the popular masses on the political stage." For the first time, the masses exercised "the popular sovereignty that no longer found any expression at all in the representative Chamber," Gramsci argued ("Il popolo" 9-10). In these comments, Gramsci drew on Papini's analysis, which he repeatedly cited in his Prison Notebooks.
Papini began his comments, titled "I fatti di giugno" ("The Events of June"), by arguing that parliament's claim to constitute a marketplace of ideas, in which rational debate determines public policy by consensus, diverts attention from the struggle among competing interests that is deciding policy backstage. "The REAL political life of the country consists in this Marketplace of Interests, where each individual or party tries to get the better of his rival," he wrote (Papini's emphases). "The rest is just slogans, big words and hot air balloons, personal aggrandizement, partisan rivalries, corridor conspiracies, and drum shots for the folks in the gallery" (181). In his previous call for an electoral boycott, Papini had focused on the actors. Now he turned to those who had been relegated to the passive role of spectators. "Sooner or later, however, the folks in the gallery catch on to the comedy and find it too costly, because they have to buy a new ticket for each act," he wrote. "The folks in the gallery, who are for the most part ignorant innocents kept clueless by the newspaper accomplices of the various theatrical companies, applaud or boo the actors, but they would like something better. So every now and then they riot and let blood. And for a moment, tragedy interrupts the comedy" ("Fatti di giugno" 181).
Here Papini pulled together both strands of the stage metaphor discussed so far. First, he presented a powerful image of the distinction between actor and spectator, which is essential to any democratic notion of political agency. As his image clearly suggests, this distinction consists in the difference between being on stage and being in the audience. Secondly, he identified what was at stake in the comedy trope first elaborated by Pfemfert in Die Aktion. The critique implicit in this metaphor suggests that the comic effect of parliamentary cooptation trivializes public life by neutralizing social differences. As Pfemfert's modification of the Mandan analogy to opium indicates, parliamentary comedy had the effect of deadening democratic desires and keeping the masses docile. Indeed, the resolution of comedy in conciliatory laughter offers an insight into liberal democracy's quest for social consensus, which can only be had at the cost of suppressing difference. Parliament's tendency to suppress conflict and present a steady program of comedy had created a dangerous reservoir of resentment, Papini suggested. If parliamentary debate had devolved into comedy, then a higher form of theater was needed, one that could elevate political life to drama and provide a forum for its public manifestation. This is what the masses achieved when their latent resentment erupted into manifest violence, he argued. For one week in June, the political stage was transposed from parliament to streets, squares, and factory floors. For a week, the roles of actor and spectator were reversed, as the masses took the stage and became actors.
As Papini indicated, the counterpoint to comedy-tragedy-is defined by the existential distinction between life and death. The psychological appeal of comedy resides in its ability to present reassuring images of social reconciliation. According to Hegel's definition in Lectures on Aesthetics, comedy can only end with the reconciliation of a protagonist who has challenged the ethical order because his or her challenge represents an expression of arbitrary individuality that lacks ethical substance. Once the protagonist has been shown that the principle s/he represents (such as greed) is arbitrary, then nothing prevents him or her from renouncing the vice and being welcomed back into the ethical order. Indeed, this reconciliation reaffirms the legitimacy of the existing order. Paradoxically, it is the tragic hero, the one who puts his or her life on the line for an ethical principle and refuses to back down, who must die, if a more just order is to emerge. In Sophocles's Antigone, for example, where the antagonistic principles of state sovereignty and family love collide in an ethical dilemma, the subjective (and thus arbitrary) aspect of Antigone's defiance of Creon must be expunged by her death in order for the objective, ethical principle she represents to be recog-
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2006] This is what liberal democracy appears to have accomplished in the twentieth century, at least according to Fukuyama's account. Norberto Bobbio was more skeptical about the success of liberal democracy, arguing that the progressive expansion of the franchise had put the union of liberalism and democracy on the verge of crisis by century's end (1-2). This union was never more than a marriage of convenience between contradictory traditions, Chantal Mouffe observes. On one hand, the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, which emphasizes rule of law, human rights, and individual liberty, and, on the other, an older democratic tradition, which stresses equality, the identity of governing and governed, and the ideal of popular sovereignty. There is no necessary relation between the two traditions, Mouffe insists, only an historically contingent articulation. Today this relation is construed in a way that privileges individual rights while neglecting the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty. She warns that this tendency has created a "democratic deficit" and argues that the viability of democratic institutions depends on the ability to develop an ensemble of practices that can create "democratic citizens" (95) . This is the problem Expressionists and Futurists addressed with the metaphor of politics as stage. Neither group developed a clear vision of what form mass democracy might take, but on one point they were agreed. Their use of the stage metaphor insisted that mass political participation depended on a qualitative transformation of the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty and not simply the quantitative extension of voting rights.
In contrast, the liberal democratic order that triumphed in Fukuyama's narrative rejected the figure of politics as stage, at least in the participatory sense intended by Expressionists and Futurists, for something more akin to Weber's model of government as a business. The result is democracy as corporation, in which the individual shareholder bears only limited responsibility for the success or failure of the collective enterprise. This figure helps to explain the reluctance of contemporary political parties to call for personal sacrifices on behalf of the social collective, since it defines each citizen's relation to society as that of an individual investor risking private capital for personal gain. Fukuyama admitted that this model of politics would offer citizens few opportunities to seek recognition. As a result, he predicted that the quest for recognition would be transposed from politics, which he understands as a metaphorical marketplace of ideas, to the literal marketplace of economic competition. At the same time, he voiced doubts that economic competition would provide an adequate substitute for the agonistic struggle unique to political life. This is the "contradiction" liberal democracy has yet to resolve, Fukuyama concluded (End of History 314). It is the same problem Expressionists and Futurists addressed with the metaphor of politics as stage, at a time when mass democracy was little more than a futuristic dream. The actuality of this problem today suggests a need to re-envision the ideal of mass democracy as a horizon of expectation that cannot be reduced to closure in the casting of ballots or resolution of policy debates. The alternative, as contemporary practices demonstrate, is democracy as business as usual, in which the participation of most citizens is limited to that of passive consumers.
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